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Abstract— Effective software safety standards will contribute 
to confidence, or assurance, in the safety of the systems in which 
the software is used. It is infeasible to demonstrate a correlation 
between standards and accidents, but there is an alternative view 
that makes standards “testable”. Software projects are subject to 
uncertainty; good standards reduce uncertainty more than poor 
ones. Similarly assurance or integrity levels in standards should 
define an uncertainty gradient. The paper proposes an argument 
-based method of reasoning about uncertainty that can be used as 
a basis for conducting experiments (tests) to evaluate standards. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
If software safety standards were effective then they should 
contribute to achievement or assurance of safety (or both). 
However, it is infeasible to show effectiveness of standards in 
terms of operational safety; the paper briefly examines the 
basis for this claim then outlines an approach to evaluation 
(“testing”) of standards using arguments about uncertainty. 
A. The Unplanned Experiment 
The motivation for the workshop explains the infeasibility 
of showing that software has, say, a 10-9 per hour unsafe failure 
rate [1]; thus standards are an “unplanned experiment”. There 
are additional factors that emphasize the infeasibility of 
establishing a direct link between standards and safety: 
• Cause-effect relationship – software development 
depends on the skills of engineers, management, tools, 
resources, etc.; showing the contribution of standards 
to achieved safety (cause and effect) is very difficult; 
• Standards production – standards arise from a social 
process, do not reflect what any company actually does 
(some are closer than others), and are subject to (a high 
degree) of interpretation.  
Arguably, these two factors (especially the latter) explain 
the significant differences observed in published standards [2]. 
B. How Would we Know? 
Several authors have proposed ways of improving the 
standards process, e.g. the “filter model” [3]. This paper takes 
the view that the fundamental challenge in assuring software 
contributions to system safety is management of uncertainty; in 
short assurance increases as uncertainty decreases.  
More specifically, there are two sorts of uncertainty: 
1. About faults or limitations in requirements; 
2. About faults or limitations in implementation. 
We refer to these as essential and accidental uncertainty, 
respectively. In a perfect world, a standard would remove all 
uncertainty giving absolute assurance in the requirements and 
implementation; in the real world, a better standard, or higher 
assurance/integrity level in a standard, will reduce uncertainty 
more than weaker standards/lower assurance/integrity levels. 
II. SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY 
To be able to model and reason about uncertainty requires 
an identification of sources of uncertainty; this is challenging, 
but can be approached based on the essential/accidental split. 
A. Essential Uncertainty 
Essential uncertainty, vis a vis the software requirements, 
arises from limited understanding of the physics (or chemistry, 
etc.) of the embedding system, including sensors and actuators, 
and in the operational environment. For example, do we know: 
“How the radar’s detection capability can vary with the 
weather, particulates from volcanoes, etc.”? 
This is a source of uncertainty that can be analyzed relative 
to a system model, e.g. Parnas’ 4-variable model [4].  
B. Accidental Uncertainty 
Accidental uncertainty reflects limitations in development 
methods and in tools, etc. In the context of standards, the focus 
is on the requirements, recommendations, or objectives that the 
standard “promotes” and the residual uncertainties. 
If we ask “uncertainty with respect to what” we can find a 
number of candidates, e.g. the “4+1 principles” [5]. The view 
adopted here, is that there are two core principles: 
1. The safety requirements completely reflect the contribution 
of the software in the system to hazards. 
2.  The software meets the safety requirements. 
 
Principle 1 covers both potential software “failure modes” 
and positive contributions, e.g. mitigations.  
III. REASONING ABOUT UNCERTAINTY 
To analyze standards we propose to reason (argue) about 
their influence over uncertainty (this is different to Holloway’s 
analysis [6] of DO178C [7] using GSN [8]); as we shall see 
below this gives a basis for some “planned experiments”. 
A. Approach to Argumentation 
Several notations have been proposed for safety cases, e.g. 
GSN that was based on work by Toulmin [9], see Fig. 1: 
 Fig. 1. Toulmin’s Argument Structure 
The elements of the structure are as follows: 
• D – data (evidence) on which the argument rests; 
• C – claim (conclusions) of the argument; 
• W – warrant (justification) that the claim follows from 
the data; 
• Q – qualification (uncertainty) of the claim; 
• R – rebuttal, or source of the uncertainty. 
Here we use Toulmin’s structure as it addresses uncertainty 
and it is possible to “chain” arguments to counter the rebuttals 
– to argue that a particular source of uncertainty is controlled.  
B. Applying the Argumentation Approach 
In applying the argumentation approach, we can consider 
how to reason about the sources of essential and accidental 
uncertainty. We briefly illustrate this with the principles set out 
at II B, relating mainly to accidental uncertainty. We note that 
many sources of uncertainty can affect a claim, so we employ a 
tabular form of argument, repeating argument elements, e.g. 
the qualification, as needed. The small fragment set out in 
Table 1 draws on the concepts in DO178C.  
TABLE I.  SAFETY REQUIREMENTS SATISFACTION 
Software Safety Requirements Met Princi
ple 2 Interpretation Link 
C1 All software safety requirements are satisifed by requirements testing and MC/DC testing.   
W Testing shows requirements met under all  path conditions   
Q1 Subject to more complex data dependencies  R1 
Q2 Subject to absence of run-time errors R2 
Arguments can be constructed to counter R1 and R2. For 
R2, we can carry out reviews against coding standards and for 
compatibility with the target machine (DO 178C objectives) or 
do static analysis with tools such as the SPARK Examiner [10].  
Arguably use of tools such as the Examiner are better than 
human review, but both rest on further uncertainties – reviewer 
competence and tool integrity (assessed using the DO178C 
Tool Qualification Annex). You don’t need the above approach 
in this simple case, but it (potentially) gives a systematic way 
of evaluating standards’ “effectiveness” in all their complexity. 
IV. TOWARDS PLANNED EXPERIMENTS 
The “plan for a plan” is simple; use the principles and 
argumentation approach to model standards of interest and then 
“test” the standards’ effectiveness, for example by asking: 
“Is the integrity/assurance level scheme in the standard 
valid in that higher levels reduce uncertainty more than 
lower ones?” 
If it were valid, then the uncertainties would reduce with 
the level. This can be tested in several forms of experiment: 
1. Paper/expert review; 
2. Manufactured experiment, perhaps using students; 
3. Real-world experience using company data. 
These experiments become progressively more difficult, to 
conduct in a proper manner but doing the first would indicate 
whether or not doing the later ones would be worthwhile.  
The author speculates that, if experimenting with standards, 
some, e.g. [11], would “fail” the above test, due to the way in 
which its requirements are stated; this might be a useful result 
in itself. Note that this is different to the approach in [12] that 
produces the “hidden” argument in standards; the approach set 
out here is using uncertainty as a “measure” of standards. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper’s hypothesis is that a constructive way to think 
about assessment of standards is via models of uncertainty, set 
out in argument form. It also suggests that the approach could 
potentially enable planned experiments to be carried out and it 
is believed that interesting insights would arise as a result.  
Turning to the title: software development and assurance is 
beset by uncertainties (doubts). The discussion has focused on 
accidental uncertainties however testing always has a role in 
reducing the essential uncertainties (notwithstanding the use of 
simulation models), as only testing validates our understanding 
of the real world, including human operators.  
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